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Abstract 
 
We examine the failure determinants for large quoted UK industrials using a panel data set 
comprising 539 firms observed over the period 1988-93. The empirical design employs data 
from company accounts and is based on Chamberlain’s conditional binomial logit model, 
which allows for unobservable, firm-specific, time-invariant factors associated with failure 
risk. We find a noticeable degree of heterogeneity across the sample companies. Our panel 
results show that, after controlling for unobservables, lower liquidity measured by the quick 
assets ratio, slower turnover proxied by the ratio of debtors turnover, and profitability were 
linked to the higher risk of insolvency in the analysis period. The findings appear to support 
the proposition that the current cash-flow considerations, rather than the future prospects of 
the firm, determined company failures over the 1990s recession.    
  
JEL Codes : G33 
 
Keywords: Company Failure Risk, Unobserved Heterogeneity, Conditional Fixed Effects 
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 1. Introduction  
 
The innovation in this paper follows from the use of both time-series and cross-section data to 
model the empirical determinants of company failure on large quoted industrial UK firms 
observed over the period 1988-93. Numerous studies, employing cross-sectional data and 
independent variables derived from accounts, have provided models that have proved useful 
for the identification of poorly performing companies with financial profiles similar to those of 
firms placed into regimes of legal insolvency. Taffler and Tisshaw (1977), Marais (1979), 
Taffle r (1982), Goudie  (1987), Goudie and Meeks  (1991), Cosh and Hughes (1995) 
have modelled financial failure as a classification problem, where the binary response variable 
falls into one of two classes: failed firms and non-failed firms, and the risk of failure is then 
quantified using discriminant analysis combined with cross-sectional data and covariates 
purely based on accounting measures. An alternative approach based on logit, which has 
been used to model the causal relationship from firm’s attributes to the probability of failure 
was utilised by Peel, Peel, and Pope  (1986), Keasey and McGuinness (1990), and 
Morris (1997). Recent UK work by Alici (1995), Tyree and Long (1995), and Wilson, 
Chong, and Peel (1995) has employed a newer, but statistically less well defined analytical 
approach of neural networks to classify the data.1  
 
The objective of the present study is to extend existing work by using a panel of UK quoted 
companies that spans 1988-93 and reflects changes in financial performance over a recession 
period.2 This extension to panel data is based on Chamberlain’s (1980) conditional logit 
model with a binomial response. Aside from providing larger numbers of observations, which 
allows one to alleviate the cross-sectional problem of over-sampling the failed category 
relative to the proportion of failed companies in the population, a panel data set enables one 
to carry out more sophisticated statistical analysis and to increase the likelihood that valid 
conclusions regarding found associations between the failure outcome and firm’s attributes, 
are drawn. For instance, we may wish to take account of unobserved heterogeneity across 
firms by applying fixed and random effects models. While cross-section estimates of company 
failure determinants are likely to suffer from the problem of omitted variable bias, the use of 
panel data is one solution to the problem of controlling for underlying additive individual 
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effects. Many company characteristics might tend not to vary over time, especially over short 
periods. In addition to that, certain firm-specific attributes are simply undetectable in a cross-
sectional data set but nonetheless are likely to influence company performance and therefore 
to be correlated with observable financial ratios. Company failure is a multi-dimensional 
process. It is likely that the following unobserved individual effects are linked to the 
probability of failure: the firm’s sales exposure to export,3 organisation and ownership 
structure,4 technological and managerial qualities, “know-how” stock, industry-specific 
influences,5 aspects of the business location, industrial union power,6 as well as vulnerability to 
external shocks explained by a particular type of debt finance that can be issued, for instance, 
either at fixed rate or at variable-rate.7 The existence of firm-specific effects seems to be 
consistent with the view that selection effects of recessions are unevenly spread amongst firms 
(see e.g. Geroski and Gregg, 1996; Morris, 1997). In other words, a panel data set may 
be more robust to incomplete model specifications. Finally, in the panel of UK quoted firms, 
the data on failing firms are synchronised with the data on companies that survived the 
economic downturn of 1990-92.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the panel dataset. Section 3 
turns to the explanatory variables in our model. Section 4 deals with issues of model 
specification and estimation and section 5 presents the main results.  
 
2. The Sample 
 
We define company failure as the event of entering a legal insolvency regime (administrative 
receivership, or administration, or winding-up, i.e. liquidation). That allows us to employ in 
model development a binary response describing the failure outcome, which takes the value 1 
in the year the failing company published the last set of accounts and 0 otherwise. The data 
for the present panel study of company failure consist of company accounts’ items and market 
valuation information for the six-year period 1988-93 and were extracted from the 
DATASTREAM database in 1997. The data set is a moderately sized unbalanced panel, 
constituting 539 individual quoted industrial companies, 56 of which discontinued publishing 
financial records over these six years due to entering a legal insolvency regime. Such short and 
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wide panel appears common of data employed in microeconomic studies (see e.g. Greene, 
1997), where a relatively large number of individual units is observed over the quite small 
number of periods. Our panel is unbalanced as we equate the date of failure with the fiscal 
year, in which, according to the DATASTREAM records, the failing company issues the last 
set of accounts. Therefore, this calendar year is considered as the firm’s last year in the panel. 
In our sample, a failed company terminates reports from twelve to twenty months before 
insolvency proceedings commence, while a choice of the particular sample period of 1988-
93, is a reflection of those lead times. The years of sample data were arrived at via 
identification the dates of release of the last accounts of: (i) firms, where formal insolvency 
was concurrent with the 1990-92 recession, and (ii) companies, where failures might have 
resulted from operations during the recession, even though the recession phase had actually 
ended before the date of insolvency.  
 
Transition of companies within the unbalanced panel can be seen in Table 1. Since failing 
companies exit the panel, the sub-panel of failed firms is unbalanced. In contrast to the failed 
company category, 483 non-failing firms are being followed over the whole six-year period of 
the panel, meaning that the resulting sub-panel of non-failed firms is complete and rectangular. 
Names of 59 quoted industrial companies that entered insolvency state in the early 1990s, 
have been identified by using various editions of the London Stock Exchange Official 
Yearbook. Non-failed company names were taken from the DATASTREAM “live” list of 
quoted industrials as of 13 February 1997.8 We intend to base the panel analysis upon the 
fixed effects estimator, from which inference is drawn with respect to the effects that lie within 
the sample. Therefore it was essential to include in the data set all quoted industrials with 
consistently available records for the period. We selected 483 non-failed firms with continuos 
records over the late 1980s and through to mid 1990s. The non-failed category is deliberately 
“over-sampled” to resemble the actual incidence of insolvencies in the population. Annual 
rates of failures in the constructed panel vary from 1.01 to 3.34 per cent (Table 1). In terms 
of company mix, the population of firms selected is restricted by the exclusion of companies 
from the petroleum, transportation, and financial services sectors. Table 2 shows that more 
than 80 per cent of non-failed and failed firms come from manufacturing and services sectors.   
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3. Explanatory Variables 
 
The appropriateness of detecting the important determinants of failure within the framework of 
traditional binary response statistical models combined with explanatory variables derived 
from accounting data, is evidential from the apparent ex ante predictive ability of such 
proprietary applications for assessing quoted industrial companies as the UK-based Z-score 
model (Taffler, 1995) and the US-based ZETAÒ model (Altman, 2000). We use to 
develop the panel data model, 24 financial statement-based and equity valuation items 
reported by DATASTREAM for UK quoted industrial firms.9 Standard financial ratios 
represent the key dimensions of financial analysis, namely, profitability, turnover, gearing, and 
liquidity. As the literature on company failure (see e.g. Cosh and Hughes, 1995) has 
documented an important role for company size which may proxy causal effects of youth and 
inexperience of smaller firms, in this paper we assume that the size factor can be introduced 
into model development by employing the net sales variable. Market valuation of the firm is 
proxied by the ratio of market value to book value (premium or discount to net tangible 
assets), while the influence of dividend policy on failure risk is represented by the payout ratio 
(a reciprocal of dividend cover). Further, to proxy the firm’s net worth, we also included an 
index for the book value of ordinary shareholders’ funds computed as the sum of share capital 
and reserves less intangibles. This so called “net tangible assets index” is defined as a 
percentage of the assets figure obtained from the first (in terms of DATASTREAM records) 
accounts; it is often used for solvency control, and therefore might be important in determining 
the risk of default. To the company, as a corporate identity, shareholders’ funds are usually 
the only source of funds, other then liabilities, which it can use to finance assets. Changes in 
ordinary shareholders’ funds also matter because a borrower’s financial position is a key 
determinant of the cost of external finance. However, net worth at book values represents a 
rather crude estimate of the firm’s value, because the assets shown in the balance sheet are 
usually recorded at historic cost (less depreciation) and may differ greatly from their current 
market values. Finally, the ratio between published tax and published pre-tax profit is used to 
proxy the tax position of the company. The comprehensive range allows us to implement in 
the panel data analysis the general-to-specific modelling approach10 and via statistical 
reduction identify the financial performance variables, explaining failure risk for our data set. 
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Names and descriptive statistics of independent variables employed in modelling are 
displayed in Table 3. To handle the problem of non-stationarity in data, the original 
DATASTREAM values were normalised with respect to means and standard errors of 
relevant cross-sections for each calendar year of the panel, that is each observation is relative 
to the year mean and therefore each within year covariate is centred on zero. 
 
4. A Fixed Effects Binomial Logit Model for Panel Data  
 
The model with a binary dependent variable can be formulated in terms of an underlying latent 
variable. Typically, for a possibly unbalanced panel we would specify: 
 
ititiity exß +¢+= a
* ,        (1) 
 
where we observe 1=ity  if 0
* >ity , and 0=ity  otherwise. 
 
In (1) we index all variables by an i  for the individual cross-sectional unit ),...,1( Ni =  and a 
t  for the time period ),...,1( Tt = . There are K  explanatory variables (financial determinants) 
in itx , which are observed, not including a constant. This means that effects of a change in x  
are the same for all units and all periods, but the average level for individual i  may be different 
from that for unit j .  
 
The ia  captures the effects of those variables that are peculiar to the th-i  individual member 
of the panel and that are constant over time. Two basic approaches for modelling 
heterogeneity are a fixed effects treatment and a random effects treatment. The fixed effects 
approach takes ia  to be a group specific constant term and ite  is assumed to be independent 
and identically distributed over individuals and time with mean zero and variance 2es : 
 
ititiity exß +¢+= a
* ,   ).,0(IID 2es=ite     (2) 
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A random effects framework specifies that ia  are different but that they can be treated as 
group specific disturbances, similar to ite , except for each group there is but a single draw 
that enters the regression identically in each period. The essential assumption is that these 
drawings are independent of the explanatory variables in itx . That leads to the random effects 
model where individual-specific constant terms are randomly distributed across cross-
sectional units. The error term in this model thus consists of two mutually independent 
components, which are also independent of jsx , namely, a time-invariant component ia  and 
a remainder component it?  that are uncorrelated over time. If we specify that itiit ?+=ae , 
the random effects model can be written as  
 
ititiit ?y +¢++= xßam
* ,   ),0(IID    );,0(IID 22 na ssa == iti ? . (3) 
 
The fixed effects approach is contrasted with the random effects one. Whether to treat the 
individual effects ia  as fixed or random can make a difference to the estimates of the ß  
parameters when T  is small and N  is large relative to T (Verbeek, 2000). A distinction is 
that under a fixed effects approach we condition on the s'ia , so that their distribution plays 
no role. This interpretation makes sense if the individuals in the sample are “one of a kind”, 
such as large quoted companies of the present study, and cannot be viewed as a random 
draw from some underlying population (Greene, 1997). The fixed effects model is thus 
considered as applying only to cross-sectional units in the sample and, therefore, inferences 
are with respect to the effects that are in the sample. A random effects approach invokes a 
distribution for ia , and individual-specific constant terms are viewed as randomly distributed 
across cross-sectional units. This is appropriate if we believe that sampled cross-sectional 
units are drawn from a large population.11 Thus the random effects approach allows one to 
make inference with respect to the population characteristics. However, even if one is 
interested in the larger population of individual units, and a random effects framework seems 
appropriate, the fixed effects estimator may still be preferred. The reason for this is that it may 
be the case that ia  and itx  are correlated, in which case the random effects approach, 
ignoring this correlation, leads to inconsistent estimators due to omitted variables. 
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Two techniques have been commonly used for modelling heterogeneity on panel data with a 
binary dependent variable: a fixed effects logit model based on a conditional likelihood 
approach due to Chamberlain (1980) and a random effects probit model that is often 
referred to as Butler and Moffitt’s  (1982) “equicorrelated” model. Given that both 
categories of firms in the panel, the failed firms and the non-failed firms, represent a rather 
large proportion of equities, followed by the DATASTREAM database, and were not 
sampled randomly, we would expect the fixed effects approach to have some intuitive appeal. 
More specifically, the 489 non-failed firms in the panel represent 36.8 per cent of equities that 
were on the “live” DATASTREAM list as of February 1997, while the 56 failed companies 
account for 50.9 per cent of those quoted companies, that according to the London Stock 
Exchange Official Year Book entered the insolvency state over the period 1988-93. The list 
of firms selected for the panel analysis was compiled by excluding transportation, petroleum, 
and financial services companies due to their specific taxation and accounting policies, and 
then through unavoidable filtering of companies due to the usual requirement of record 
completeness and continuity for the period of the analysis. The above might well have resulted 
in non-random selection of both categories – the failed companies and non-failed companies. 
Further, in the present study we expect that unobserved individual firm-specific effects, such 
as, for instance, managerial quality, industry-specific influences, industrial union power, 
organisation and ownership structure, are likely to be correlated with observable 
characteristics of corporate performance, captured by financial statement-based and equity 
market valuation measures. Therefore it would appear reasonable to assume that the fixed 
effects logit model would yield an appropriate specification for the present panel study.  
 
A fixed effects logit model that accounts for heterogeneity is given by: 
 
iti
iti
e
eFailureY xß
xß
¢+
¢+
+
== a
a
1
))( 1(Prob .     (4) 
 
If we treat ia  in (4) as fixed unknown parameters, we essentially including N dummy 
variables in the model. Maximising the log-likelihood function with respect to ß  and ia  
(i=1,...,N) results in a consistent estimator provided that the number of time periods T goes to 
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infinity. For a short and wide panel, with fixed T and ¥®N , the estimators are inconsistent. 
The reason is that for fixed T, the number of parameters grows with the sample size N, which 
results in an “incidental parameters” problem arising in any fixed effects model. That is, any ia  
can be only estimated consistently if we have a growing number of observations for individual 
i, thus we have T tending to infinity. In general, the inconsistency of iaˆ  for fixed T will carry 
over to the estimator for ß . 
 
Chamberlain (1980) suggested an approach to estimating a panel data model with a binary 
dependent variable, where N is large and T is small. He considers the set of T observations 
for unit i as a group, and then use the likelihood function conditional upon a set of statistics it  
that are sufficient for ia . This means that conditional upon it , an individual’s likelihood 
contribution no longer depends on ia  but still depends upon ß .12 In the fixed effects logit 
model, ii yt =  is a sufficient statistic for ia , and consistent estimation is possible by 
conditional maximum likelihood. That is we discard alternative sets for which 0=å
T
t
ity  or 
Ty
T
t
it =å , because these cross-sectional units never change states and thus contribute zero 
to the likelihood function. The conditional distribution of iTi yy ,...,1  is degenerate if 0=it  or 
1=it . The conditional likelihood function is written as  
 
)|,...,,(Prob
1
2211
1
åÕ
==
====
T
t
itiTiTiiii
N
i
c yyYyYyYL .   (6) 
 
With homogeneity )( aa =i , the model can be estimated as a binomial logit model. In order 
to test the null hypothesis of the homogeneity restriction a Hausman-type test13 based on the 
difference between Chamberlain’s conditional maximum likelihood estimator (CMLE) and the 
usual logit maximum likelihood estimator (ML), ignoring the individual effects, is performed.  
 
Constructing the difference 
MLCMLE
^^
ßßq -=ˆ  
 11
with the variance          ),()()ˆ(  MLCMLE VVV
^^
ßßq -=  
 
   q)]q[V(q 1 ˆˆˆ -¢=m      (7) 
 
can be used as a 2Kc statistic under the null, where K is the dimensionality of ß . 
Whether the null hypothesis of homogeneity is true or not, Chamberlain’s conditional 
maximum likelihood estimator is consistent, but inefficient under the null, because it fails to use 
the homogeneity restriction. The usual maximum likelihood estimator is consistent and efficient 
only under the null of homogeneity and inconsistent under the alternative. 
 
5. Empirical Results  
 
Table 4 presents the results from the logit analysis for three parsimonious models derived from 
a more general specification that includes all 24 financial variables.14 Covariates were 
eliminated using a sequence of independent Likelihood Ratio tests. The failure outcome is 
denoted by 1 and the opposite state is assigned 0, therefore a positive (negative) coefficient 
indicates that the factor, expressed by the covariate positively (negatively) correlated with the 
outcome of company failure. The diagnostics indicate that the panel data models have good 
overall fit – the Likelihood Ratio test statistics are significant at the 0.1 per cent level for all 
three models. In all Models 1, 2, and 3, based on the Hausman 2c  statistics, the null 
hypothesis of homogeneity of intercepts is rejected at the 5% level and better. As discussed 
above, this implies that control for the firm-specific effects is necessary and that, therefore, the 
results of cross-sectional analyses may be biased. Regarding the importance of individual 
dimensions of company performance, the absence of gearing measures from all the three 
models is noteworthy. With regard to other dimensions of company performance, profitability, 
turnover, liquidity, and changes in net worth (measured by the index of net tangible assets at 
book value) have a strong effect on the probability of failure for the firms in the panel. When 
the influence of ratios, expressing a profitability factor, is examined, at first glance, the estimate 
coefficients in Models 1, 2, and 3 seem not all to have the correct sign. For instance, the 
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coefficient for the cumulative profitability ratio and the coefficient of the operating profit 
margin (in Models 1 and 2) have contra-intuitive positive signs.  
The essential implication of positively signed coefficients for the cumulative profitability ratio, 
significant at the 10% level, is that failing companies are characterised by a greater ratio of 
revenue reserves relative to total assets employed. Aside from that, Models 1 and 2 link a 
greater likelihood of failure to higher operating profit margins, but this variable is insignificant. 
Positive coefficients for the net profit margin (significant at the 10% level and better in Models 
1, 2, and 3) appear to provide further support to a “teasing” positive relationship between 
profitability and the risk of failure. However, coefficients for the pre-tax profit margin 
(significant at the 10% level and better) are negative. 
 
One possible explanation of the signs of these explanatory variables stems from the definitions 
of ratios adopted by DATASTREAM. For example, the operating profit margin is calculated 
before both interest expenses and losses on termination of operations. On the other hand, the 
pre-tax profit margin ignores pre-tax and after-tax profits of associated companies and 
undertakings, whereas the net (after-tax) profit margin takes account of amounts of 
associates’ profits attributable to the parent company. Therefore, the fact that the pre-tax 
profit margin is negative, but the net profit margin is positive, might have to do with the equity 
method, used in financial reporting of companies, which have subsidiaries, and where financial 
results of subsidiaries are significant in their overall impact. Under the equity method, the 
parent company often shows in consolidated accounts proportional profits of its associates 
attributable to the group. Since profits are attributed it is possible that little or nothing has been 
received by the group, and its liquidity position has not been improved. In other words, higher 
profitability as measured by the net profit margin might have no bearing on the liquidity of the 
business. For further investigation of the “incorrectly” signed net profit margin, more detailed 
information of cash flow reports and relevant notes is needed, however, financial 
characteristics reflected in our data preclude our pursuing this aspect of analysis further. As 
far as the ambiguous sign for the measure of cumulative profitability is concerned, it might be 
explained by the possible impact that accounting policies might have on the accounting values 
of retained profits, because attributable revenue reserves of subsidiaries are included into 
revenue reserves of a parent company, in line with the equity accounting method. Moreover, 
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the positive sign of the operating profit margin, considered together with the negatively signed 
coefficient for the pre-tax profit margin ratio, might be an indication that failed companies in 
the sample were productive and economically valuable as they would still be trading and 
receiving revenue from operations in the years preceding insolvency. At the same time, they 
are equally likely to suffer greater losses from terminating operations and incurring greater 
interest expenses as compared with the non-failing group. That tentative interpretation of the 
subtle interplay between the four profitability ratios, in our view, might reflect certain 
underlying factors such as shifts in corporate sector indebtedness combined with high nominal 
interest rates before the 1990-92 recession, such that the high gearing effect is captured by 
the incidental parameters. Further, “conflicting” signs of profit margins and the cumulative 
profitability ratio are consistent with the fixed effects specification, as they would appear to 
accord with the fact that, of the failed category in our panel, many firms are organised as a 
group or a holding company, and this organisational characteristic might also have been 
captured by the firm-specific fixed effects.  
 
All three models suggest an appropriate negative relationship between turnover measures and 
failure risk. The ratio of turnover to net current assets is insignificant in Model 1, while the 
debtors turnover ratio is significant at the 10% level in all three models, reflecting that before 
failure there is either a slowdown in trade, due to a fall in demand, or a decline in debtors 
quality resulting in bad debts, not recognised by provisions. The liquidity dimension is 
captured by a quick assets ratio, significant at the 5% level and better, that deals with the 
most liquid assets and is regarded as the best guide to short-term solvency. In all three 
models, the quick assets ratio suggests the expected negative influence of liquidity on the risk 
of failure. Lastly, all models yield the net tangible assets index as a failure determinant that is 
significant at the 5% level and better. As shown in Table 4, a company is more likely to fail if 
its index of net tangible assets is declining. This result is intuitively logical as the borrower’s net 
worth represents a buffer or a crude margin of long-term solvency between the assets and the 
liabilities, although, being based on book values and hence historically oriented, this measure 
depends upon accounting conventions. Moreover, the strong influence of the assets index 
should be treated with caution as financial reporting policies and practice, which affect book 
values, might have been inconsistent across companies and years followed by the panel.  
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6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has reported empirical results on financial ratio-based determinants of company 
failure obtained with the panel data on large quoted UK industrials for 1988-93. A better 
understanding of the factors determining corporate financial distress and failure, is important 
because at the micro level, it is an ingredient of investment decisions, especially in the context 
of corporate lending, while at the macro level, it is an essential step in designing the inclusive 
and efficient policies preventing and ameliorating crises, by banks and regulators. 
 
In the unbalanced panel we follow 539 companies of which 56 firms exit the panel due to 
severe financial distress problems resulted in formal insolvency. The structure of the panel 
constructed resembles the actual population proportions of the examined categories of failed 
and non-failed firms. We employ an econometric technique that controls for the unobservable 
permanent differences across companies, which are likely to affect the propensity to failure of 
an individual firm. We find evidence of considerable heterogeneity across companies in the 
panel, which suggests that the panel data estimates are preferable to the cross-sectional 
estimates.  
 
As for the individual determinants, our analysis provides the following findings. When the fixed 
individual effects are controlled for, our results with regard to important financial dimensions, 
suggest that narrowly defined liquidity, profitability, turnover, and changes in net worth 
(measured as the book value of net tangible assets) are the key determinants of failure for 
firms in our panel data set. Moreover, modelling with the panel data captures changes in both 
short-term liquidity and long-term solvency. The documented importance of the liquidity 
dimension emphasises that the current cash flow considerations, rather than the economic 
value of the firm based on the future free cash flows, are more pertinent to the explanation of 
company failure in our panel. That result is consistent the findings reported in the time-series 
study of the aggregate rate of company insolvency by Turner, Coutts, and Bowden (1992), 
who argue that failure of the banks to extend to distressed companies short-term credit on the 
basis of the long-term potential is an important structural weakness of the British economy. 
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The results also show that the event of failure is associated with lower pre-tax profit margins. 
However, unexpectedly, the analysis also identifies a concurrent and of roughly equal 
magnitude, positive link between the net profit margin and insolvency risk, which, under the 
equity method used in financial reporting of groups, might be linked to that fact that profits of 
associates are attributable to the parent company. This observation appears to be in line with 
evidence from Geroski and Gregg (1996) that holding companies had fared less 
successfully in the 1990-92 recession. In contrast to existing cross-sectional studies we do 
not detect in our panel an association between gearing and the probability of insolvency, when 
models of failure are conditioned on the fixed effects. Lastly, inference presented here was 
drawn at the costs of the assumption of the fixed effects and must be interpreted with caution 
since the sample cover just six years and the results are applicable only to companies in the 
study, not to the additional firms outside the sample range.  
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 Table 1:  Transition within the Panel of UK Industrial Companies for 1988-93 
   (Failure is determined as the time of release of the last accounts)  
 
  
 Unbalanced Panel: 1988-93 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
       
Total 539 539 521 505 493 488 
Companies “live” in the current year and subsequent years of the panel 483 483 483 483 483 483 
Companies failing over the current and subsequent years of the panel 56 56 38 22 10 5 
Cumulative total of companies failed in preceding years and in the current 
year 
- 18 34 46 51 56 
Companies failing in the current year t - 18 16 12 5 5 
Companies failing in the current year t, per cent - 3.34 3.07 2.38 1.01 1.02 
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Table 2:  Sectoral Composition of the UK Industrial Company Panel for 1988-93,  
 Breakdown of Observational Units by Economic Group (Percentages in parentheses) 
 
  
 FT-SE  Economic Groups 
 
 
Mineral 
Extraction 
General 
Industrials 
Consumer 
Goods 
 
Services 
 
Utilities 
 
Total 
Unbalanced Panel: Distribution across 1988-93 (N=539) 
             
1988  Non-Failed 1 (0.19) 307 (56.96) 80 (14.84) 150 (27.83) 1 (0.19) 539 (100) 
1988  Failed - - - - - - - - -  0 (100) 
1989  Non-Failed 1 (0.19) 299 (57.39) 78 (14.97) 142 (27.26) 1 (0.19) 521 (100) 
1989  Failed - - 8 (44.44) 2 (11.11) 8 (44.44) - - 18 (100) 
1990  Non-Failed 1 (0.20) 289 (57.23) 77 (15.25) 137 (27.13) 1 (0.20) 505 (100) 
1990  Failed - - 10 (62.50) 1 (6.25) 5 (31.25) - - 16 (100) 
1991  Non-Failed 1 (0.20) 285 (57.81) 77 (15.62) 129 (26.17) 1 (0.20) 493 (100) 
1991  Failed - - 4 (33.33) - - 8 (66.67) - - 12 (100) 
1992  Non-Failed 1 (0.20) 282 (57.79) 77 (15.78) 127 (26.02) 1 (0.20) 488 (100) 
1992  Failed - - 3 (60.00) - - 2 (40.00) - - 5 (100) 
1993  Non-Failed 1 (0.21) 279 (57.76) 76 (15.73) 126 (26.09) 1 (0.21) 483 (100) 
1993  Failed - - 3 (60.00) 1 (20.00) 1 (20.00) - - 5 (100) 
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Table .3: Descriptive Statistics for UK Quoted Companies in the 1988-93 Panel, 483 Non-failed Companies and 56 Failed Companies 
 with a Maximum of 6 Years of Data on Each Company, Sample Size 3,085 [(488´6)+ (5´5)+ (12´4)+ (16´3)+(18´2)] 
 
continued on next page 
 
 
Mean St. Dev. Annual Means 
 
Original Values, Levels  Original Values, Levels  
 
Full Sample: 3,085 obs.  539 firms  539 firms  521 firms  505 firms  493 firms  488 firms 
 
1988-93 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Financial Dimension        
Accounting Variable          
Size         
Total Sales (net of trade discounts (£,m))  546.116 1405.888 424.586 501.920 549.124 565.561 601.056 651.352 
Profitability         
Return on Shareholders’ Capital (percentage)   10.510 101.743 17.024 16.563 8.034 14.951 9.791 -4.566 
Return on Capital Employed (percentage) 15.502 48.046 21.096 21.093 12.131 12.019 12.849 13.072 
Return on Net Fixed Assets (percentage)  19.080 99.506 39.119 32.561 20.558 7.612 3.020 8.637 
Cumulative Profitability   0.341 2.701 0.401 0.336 0.349 0.226 0.420  
Operating Profit Margin (percentage)  6.746 23.250 9.048 8.751 7.490 6.020 5.630 3.092 
Pre-tax Profit Margin  (percentage)  5.912 20.287 8.835 7.982 6.385 4.537 4.671 2.585 
Net Profit Margin (percentage)  3.537 19.463 5.886 5.034 3.778 2.540 2.925 0.692 
Turnover         
Turnover / Fixed Assets  6.409 11.062 6.496 6.179 6.020 5.930 2.741 7.197 
Turnover / Net Current Assets  9.908 153.093 25.651 4.062 4.440 12.118 5.960 6.525 
Stock Turnover 17.621 105.138 25.802 12.906 12.477 20.242 17.710 16.511 
Debtors Turnover  7.431 12.803 7.590 6.983 7.491 7.305 7.392 7.871 
Creditors Turnover  5.221 2.424 5.190 5.061 5.194 5.316 5.255 5.337 
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Table 3: - Continued  
 
 
Mean St. Dev. Annual Means 
 
Original Values, Levels Original Values, Levels  
 
Full Sample: 3,085 obs. 539 firms  539 firms  521 firms  505 firms  493 firms  488 firms 
 
1988-93 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Financial Dimension         
Accounting Variable          
Gearing         
Capital Gearing (percentage)  33.221 99.393 25.174 36.902 31.771 37.460 31.269 37.252 
Income Gearing (percentage)  9.239 922.089 16.703 18.192 57.520 -50.897 39.138 -28.376 
Borrowing Ratio 0.614 5.110 0.504 0.937 0.702 0.356 0.547 0.624 
Gross Cash-flow / Total Liabilities  0.098 0.684 0.171 0.101 0.090 0.070 0.093 0.054 
Loan Capital / Equity and Reserves  0.336 4.052 0.224 0.596 0.346 0.216 0.324 0.297 
Liquidity         
Working Capital Ratio 1.573 0.993 1.651 1.528 -0.080 1.548 1.621 1.585 
Quick Assets Ratio 0.987 0.857 1.026 0.937 0.935 0.970 1.036 1.022 
Other         
Market Value/Book Value 2.171 6.163 2.646 2.279 1.651 1.623 2.163 2.660 
Payout Ratio 0.490 3.198 2.750 0.584 0.559 0.623 0.652 0.157 
Assets Index (percentage)  1991.846 15673.119 1924.887 2018.541 1898.274 1997.071 2047.921 2078.299 
Tax Ratio (percentage)  26.305 173.176 29.896 29.409 9.461 28.041 24.251 37.233 
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Table 4: Results from Fixed Effects Binary Logit for the Unbalanced Panel of UK 
Quoted Companies, the Panel Period 1988-93 
 
 
Alternative Specifications of Fixed Effects Binary Logit 
For the Unbalanced Panel of UK Quoted Companies, for 1988-93, 
Failure Times are Defined as Years the Last Accounts Released, 
N=539, T=6, Sample Size 3,085 [(488´6)+(5 ´5)+(12´4)+(16´3)+(18´2)], 
56 Failed Companies 
 
 
Financial Dimension 
Accounting Variable  
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2  
 
Model 3 
 Coefficient (two-tailed p-value of asymptotic t-statistic) 
Profitability       
Cumulative Profitability 0.314 (0.060) 0.302 (0.075) - - 
Operating Profit Margin 0.755 (0.155) 0.765 (0.147) - - 
Pre-tax Profit Margin  -3.484 (0.028) -3.754 (0.018) -2.766 (0.070) 
Net Profit Margin  2.858 (0.036) 3.107 (0.023) 2.666 (0.061) 
Turnover       
Turnover /Net Current Assets  -0.747 (0.166) - - - - 
Debtors Turnover -3.914 (0.059) -3.697 (0.067) -2.902 (0.087) 
Liquidity       
Quick Assets Ratio -3.603 (0.011) -3.568 (0.009) -2.622 (0.016) 
Net Worth       
Assets Index -92.028 (0.002) -99.200 (0.001) -100.789 (0.001) 
Log Likelihood 
at Convergence 
 
-30.84 
 
-32.28 
 
-34.25 
 
c2 statistic of LR Test15 
(p-value) 
65.71 
(0.000) 
62.83 
(0.000) 
58.91 
(0.000) 
 
Hausman Fixed effects Test  
c2 statistic 
 
53.58 
 
33.37 
 
13.01 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) 
n 3,085 
Per cent Failed  1.8   
    
 
 22
References 
 
Alici, Y. (1995) Neural Networks in Corporate Failure Prediction: The UK Experience, Mimeo. 
 
Altman, E.I. (2000) Predicting Financial Distress o f Companies: Revisiting The Z-Score and 
 ZETAÒ Models. Mimeo. 
 
Butler, J.S and Moffitt, R. (1982) A Computationally Efficient Quadrature Procedure for the One  
Factor Multinomial Probit Model. Econometrica, 50 (3), 761-4.   
 
Chamberlain, G. (1980) Analysis  of Covariance with Qualitative Data. Review of Economic  
Studies , 47, 225-38. 
 
Cosh, A.D. and Hughes, A. (1995) Failures, Acquisitions and Post-Merger Success: The Comparative 
Financial Characteristics of Large and Small Companies. ESRC Centre for Busines s Research, 
University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 18. 
 
Davidson, J.E.H., D.F. Hendry, F, Srba and S. Yeo (1978), Econometric Modelling of the Aggregate  
Time-series Relationship Between Consumers’ Expenditure and Income in the United Kingdom. 
Economic Journal, 88, 661-92. 
 
Dickerson, A.P., Gibson, H.D., and Tsakalotos, E. (1997) The Impact of Acquisitions on  
Company Performance: Evidence from a Large Panel of UK Firms. Oxford Economic  
s, 49, 344-61. 
 
Fairclough, D. and Hunter, J. (1998) The Ex-ante Classification of Take-over Targets Using Neural 
Networks. In Decision Technologies for Computational Finance. (A.P.N. Refenes, A.N.Burgess and  
J.E. Moody, Ed.) Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 381-388. 
 
Geroski, P.A. and Gregg, P. (1996) What Makes Firms Vulnerable to Recessionary Pressures?  
European Economic Review , 40, 551-7. 
 
Goudie, A.W. (1987) Forecasting Corporate Failure: The Use of Discriminant Analysis Within a  
Disaggregated Model of the Corporate Sector. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (A), 150 (1), 69-
81.  
 
Goudie, A.W., and Meeks, G. (1991) The Exchange Rate and Company Failure in a Macro - 
Micro Model of the UK Company Sector. Economic Journal, 101, 444-57.  
 
Greene, W.H. (1997) Econometric Analysis, 3rd ed. (Macmillan Publishing Comp any). 
 
Hunter, J and Komis, S (2000) Acquisition Activity in the United Kingdom: Parametric and Semi- 
Parametric Estimation, Brunel University Discussion Paper 00-06.   
 
Hausman, J.A. (1978) SpecificationTests in Econometrics. Econometrica, 46, 1251-71. 
 
Isachenkova, N. (2001) An Analysis of Industrial Company Failure in the UK and Russia for the 1990s. 
Brunel University PhD Thesis (May).  
 
Keasey, K. and McGuinness, P. (1990) The Failure of UK Industrial Firms for the Period 1976- 
1984: Logistic Analysis and Entropy Measures. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 17 (1), 
119-35. 
 
Machin, S. and Van Reenen J. (1993) Profit Margins and the Business Cycle: Evidence from UK  
Manufacturing Firms. Journal of Industrial Economics, 41, 1 (March), 29-50. 
 23
 
Maddala, G.S. (1987) Limited Dependent Variable Models Using Panel Data. Journal of  
 Human Resourses, 22 (3, Summer), 307-38. 
 
Marais, D.A.J. (1979) A Method of Quantifying Companies Relative Financial Strength. Bank of  
England Discussion Paper No. 4, London. 
 
Morris, R. (1997) Early Warning Indicators of Corporate Failure: A Critical Review of Previous 
Research and Further Empirical Evidence (Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney: Aldershot). 
 
Peel, M.J., Peel, D.A., and Pope, P.F. (1986) Predicting Corporate Failure - Some Results for the  
UK Corporate Sector. Omega, 14 (1), 5-12. 
 
Taffler, R.J. and Tisshaw, H.J. (1977) Going, Going, Gone, Four Factors Which Predict.  
Accountancy 88 (1003) March, 50-52 and 54. 
 
Taffler, R.J. (1982) Forecasting Company Failure in t he UK Using Discriminant Analysis and  
Financial Ratio Data. Journal of Royal Statistical Society, (A) 145, Part 3, 342-58. 
 
Taffler, R.J. (1995) The Use of the Z-Score Approach in Practice. Centre for Empirical Research in  
Accounting and Finance, City University Business School, Working  Paper 95/1, 15th  
June. 
 
Tyree, E. and Long, J.A. (1995) Assessing Financial Distress with Probabilistic Neural Networks.  
Mimeo. 
 
The UK Recession 1990-92, Economic Briefing, 6, February, 1994; Published by HM Treasury.  
 
Turner, P., Coutts, A., and Bowden, S. (1992) The Effect of the Thatcher Government on 
Company Liquidations: An Econometric Study. Applied Economics, 24, 935-43. 
 
Verbeek, M.(2000) A Guide to Modern Econometrics  (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.).  
 
Wilson, N., Chong, K.S., and Peel, M.J. (1995) Neural Network Simulation and the Prediction of  
Corporate Outcomes: Some Empirical Findings. International Journal of Economics of Business, 2 (1), 
31-50. 
 
Young, G. (1995) Company Liquidations, Interest Rates  and Debt. Manchester School of  
Economics and Soicial Studies , Supplement, 57-69. 
 
 24
Notes 
                                                             
1 Fairclough and Hunter (1998) have applied this approach to the classification of target firms, but they bootstrap the 
output of the solved net to analyse the performance of a model. 
2 It should be noted that although some data are available to analyse the subsequent period such analysis requires pooling 
due to a dearth of failed companies across the period 1994-2000. 
 
3 Exports continued to grow during the 1990-92 recession (see the article “The UK Recession 1990-92” in Economic 
Briefing, 6, 1994) and export -oriented firms fared better during the economy downturn (Geroski and Gregg, 1996). 
4 Using data generated from a large-scale survey of how UK firms coped with the 1991 recession, Geroski and Gregg 
(1996), identify an association in the data between organisation and ownership structure and vulnerability to the 
recession. Holding companies and firms with highly dispersed share ownership tended to be a little more vulnerable to 
recessionary pressures than functionally organised and divisionalised firms with a dominant owner (such as foreign 
owned firms). 
5 See Dickerson, Gibson, and Tsakalotos (1997). 
 
6 Machin and Van Reenen (1993) employ an explicit measure of industrial unionism in their panel study of UK firms’ 
profitability.  
 
7 Young (1995) discusses how the types of debt contract might have influenced aggregate company liquidations in the 
UK in the early 1990s, because a variable-rate debt is a good hedge against inflationary shocks whereas fixed-rate debt is a 
good hedge against real interest rate shocks. His empirical findings from the time-series study support two reasons for the 
rise in compulsory and creditors’ voluntary liquidations over the early 1990s. The first reason has been an unexpected 
rise in real interest rates in the late 1980s, and the more important second factor has been that, over the period from the 
mid-1970s to early 1990s, variable-rate debt was heavily used.  
 
8 The DATASTREAM code for this equity list was “UKQI”. For reasons of space, the list of the sample companies, is 
not reported here and can be found in Isachenkova (2001).   
 
9 For a more detailed description of the firm-specific explanatory variables used in this study, see Isachenkova (2001).  
10 A general-to-specific approach to modelling has been applied to economic time-series by Davidson, Hendry, Srba and 
Yeo et al (1978) and in the context of a cross-sectional analysis of company accounts by Hunter and Komis (2000). 
11 Appropriate scaling will help to alleviate such problem, as the differences associated with size, for example, are less 
pervasive when the data are standardised. However, the micro units in the sample may differ for other reasons, such as 
for example: industry sector or export sensitivity. 
12 In the panel data model with a binary dependent variable, the existence of a minimal sufficient statistic depends upon 
the functional form of )(×F , that is, depends on distribution of ite . If a sufficient stat istic it exists, this means that 
there exists a statistic it such that the probability mass function does not depend on ia , that is 
),|,...,(),,|,...,( 11 ßß iiTiiiiTi tyyftyyf =a . For a probit model no sufficient statistic for ia  exists. Thus in applying 
the fixed effects models to discrete dependent variables based on panel data, the logit model and the log-linear model 
seem to be the only choices (Maddala, 1987).  
 
13 Hausman (1978). 
 
14 For a full discussion of the findings see Isachenkova (2001). 
15 Note that here the Likelihood Ratios are only a function of the slope parameters and not the fixed effects themselves, 
which are never estimated. 
 
